Again he asked, "were it not well that one should ask himself how much he is really worth to his friends, and try to make himself as precious as possible, in order that his friends may not be tempted to betray him?" Not all friendship was prudential and utilitarian; some was for mere joy; and since society was masculine, friendship was often between men and boys--sometimes called homosexual; but, as Pere Festugiere warns us in his PersolUl! Religion among the Greeks, "The strange mixture of friendship and love that we find in Plato's blushing boys ... could often enough be a sort of romantic love, an affair of the heart rather than of the senses."
A new and profounder estimate of the potentialities of friendship emerged in fourth-century Greece. When Socrates, than whom there was no greater exemplar of the ideal, spoke of making oneself as precious as possible, he was of course not being merely practical; he was also saying that true friendship rests not only on the give and take of fleeting outward benefits but far more upon the exchange of "spiritual" gifts : of goodness, the product of perfection of character. Indeed, he thought of friendship as the basis of all human association. Plato went even farther and made philw, whatever form it might take, no mere object in itself but the means in the pursuit of the Ideal Good-the highest object of knowledge and the end of all action.
Aristotle, out of the ten books of his Nicomachean Ethics, devotes two to the analysis of friendship. For him, as Hugh Black says in his Friendship, a minor nineteenth-century classic, "friendship is not only a beautiful and noble thing for a man, but the realization of it is also the ideal for the state; for if its citizens be friends, then justice, which is the concern of all organized societies, is more than secured. Friendship is thus made the flower of Ethics and the root of Politics."
Even though Aristotle is a bit more down-to-earth, the developed ideal of friendship which grew out of the urgencies of fifth-century life was still an exclusive, aristocratic thing. The literature of antiquity was written not only for an elite, but for a masculine audience. For the world of lesser men it cared but little, and for women not at all. When Aristotle, in the Ethics, divides friendship into two species, the perfect, between good men who are friends for each other's own sake, since they are alike in being good, and (on the other hand) the imperfect, between inferior men who make friends for pleasure or for use, he admits that the first is rare, "because such men are few." He also holds "warm friendship possible only with a few . . . and the famous examples of poetry are pairs of friends." On this the classical mind was in accord: "Who has many friends has no friend" became proverbial.
Although, by turning a true friend into a mere transitory version of a perfect spiritual reality, this idealist philosophy seemed to corroborate the subordination of the individual to the species, the dismayed voices of Plato and Aristotle were actually those of the old Greek world of religious, social, and political unity, the . p6lis, routed and in retreat before forces making for a greater liberation of the individual-forces that for centuries were not to be denied. Throughout the eastern Mediterranean the old world of kinship, cult, and city state was giving way to a world of unstable, rival military despotisms and cosmopolitan urban hives-and to isolation and insecurity for men of all ranks.
Here, in the Hellenistic East, emerged the emancipated or "interim" type of man-"l'homme desencadre," as Festugiere calls him in Liberte chez les Grecs-"Iost in the crowd, a mere number in the midst of an infinity of human beings like himself, who know nothing of him and of whom he knows nothing." He was alone with the burden of life: "sans confidant, sans but, sans raison d'etre. ,.
As the individual, without benefit of kith or kin, replaced the family as the significant social unit, he was able-indeed, he was forced-to make the most of his new-found personality, and to test it in the free and equal choice of friends.
In the western Mediterranean, where Rome predominated after the third century B.C., individuation proceeded at a slower pace. Among the Latin peoples, the patriarchal family and clan loyalty still retained much of their ancient force; and the state itself, comparatively a recent thing, was only an extension of the household. As late as the time of Caesar, friendship (amicitia) still meant what it had often meant four centuries earlier to the Greeks-party. "Amicitia," declares Ronald Syme, "was a weapon of politics, not a sentiment based on congeniality." But the leaven of Hellenic influence was at work among the aristocracy, so that Cicero could set his Laelius in the late second century, and put words in the mouth of Scipio Aemilianus that might have come from Academe.
But the Early Empire continued the urban culture of Hellenistic times, and the liberation (or invalidation) of the individual was carried to an extreme until then unknown. This left him truly a private citizen, privatus, deprived of kin and cult: alone against a universal state. By way of compensation for these homely forms of community, he was promised peace, justice, and order. These were high, civilized goods; but cold: leaving the masters of the world dissevered, with little genuine liberty and a diminished human dignity.
Estranged from a polity he could not uuderstand, unable either t( participate in general government or successfully oppose it, the citizer turned to such warmer forms of association as a wary despotism had nOl proscribed.
The aristocratic man at any rate, trained in the literary traditions oj Hellas, was likely to take refuge in the philosophic schools. Had they not been, since Pythagorean times, avowedly groups of friends? One iD particular held friendship as "a thing ensky'd and sainted"-as an end in itself rather than as a means to virtue or to the knowledge of the Good. This was the school of Epicurus. "Friends are the bodyguard of life," one of the Master's maxims ran. We need friends, he taught, as we need physicians-for the healing of our souls, which is true happiness. Indeed, the philosophy of the Garden, with its sheltered little circles of mutual admiration that included even women, has been described as calling a new family-life into being to replace the old one that had decayed.
But, if the intimacy of clubs and sects was officially suspect, public kitchens and taverns were also repressed by law; and only the baths, under close imperial surveillance, were left. In such a world, crawling with spies and delators, to be sincere and to think out loud was to tempt the gods. It was better to claim no friend; to walk alone.
One refuge yet remained: the Stoic Porch, where men withdrew not into good companionship and the virtues that beget it but into the inner self, the abode of Deity. Stoic morality was thus essentially self-centred. Ouly the few capable of such discipline were fitted for friendship; for ordinary men, said Epictetus, differ nowise from playful dogs, whose friendship turns to battle when a bit of meat is thrown among them. Indeed, where the absence of wants and emotionless detachment made for moral perfection, the Stoic needed no friend.
To the mass of men, the Porch made even less appeal than the Garden. The average Roman, in the first centuries of the Empire--no more ready for integration on a higher level than his modem parallel in Americaturned to something less rigid and austere. In the essay, "On Having Many Friends," in his Moralia, Plutarch wrote like a neo-traditionalist of today, lamenting that his fellow Romans of the Ravian age assuaged their social hunger by haphazard contacts based on mere propinquity- kitchens.
Despite the casual, emotion-meagre "friendships," it was an Illlhappy life, that of urban men under the Empire; and all the bread and circuses, with the balnea, vina, Venus of the Pompeiian inscription thrown in to keep misery away, would not satisfy the longing to escape the burden of anxiety and isolation. Intellectually and emotionally, classical man gradually collapsed. This has been called a "failure of nerve." Indeed, Professor Chester Starr, who has studied the long and painful experiment in individuation of Mediterranean man in his Civilization and the Caesars, declares tout court, that out of it, "far more than any other factor, came the political, economic, and social decline of the Empire."
Failing true comradeship in this world, the Roman sought a friend behind phenomena: Mithra, Isis, the Logos of the Neoplatonists, and the rest; but by the late fifth century, Christianity had supplanted or subsumed them all.
The explanation may be found in the revolutionary compromise, rightly known as Catholic-"toward the whole": satisfying at once to man's individuality and to his social nature, and restoring the wholeness of living. On the one hand was Christ, the supreme individual, both God and Man, to whom all individuals as such were equally precious; on the other hand was the Church, appealing not like the Porch to a few only, but to all men, and uniting man in intimate participation with his fellows in an active and vital community life. Dignity, security, and value were restored to the true believer, in a new version of the world of I-Thou.
Friendship as an ideal, however, the product of classical man's rejection of his primary ties, nOW went into prolonged eclipse. "Christianity," as Dr. Johnson pontificated, "recommends universal benevolence--to consider all men as our brethren; which is contrary to the virtue of friendship as described by the ancient philosophers." Christians came to call one another not friends, inadequately, but "the brethren." Though friendship was not despised, the new view of man broke with the narrower pagan tradition, which exalted friendship as something Emersonian --concerned with a "circle of godlike men and women, between whom exists a lofty intelligence"; and it went beyond even the original meaning of phi/la, the love of kin, making agape--spontaneous, uncalculating, inward kindliness and affection, even for enemies--the mainspring of the new order.
For the next thousand years, not only did men continue to find the Christian togetherness satisfying, but the influence of the barbarian migrations confirmed its orientation by the Germanic emphasis upon the kin-group. Even blood-brotherhood was revived, leaving relics in the twelfth-century Arthurian myths and also in Chaucer, who not only subordinated friendship to love, but-in Palaman and Arcyte and certain Canterbury Tales-to the love of sworn brothers.
Moreover, until the twelfth century at least, the unsettled and disordered state of Western society---demanding incessant social co-operation, if only for the sake of survival-was altogether inconsistent with the spirit of individualism. As in early Greece and Rome, so in feudal France and Germany among the landholding class, as Marc Bloch showed, "friend" meant kinsman: "mother, brothers, sisters, and others related by blood or feudal alliance."
Friendship as an ideal reappeared when Western civilization attained the acme achieved in classical antiquity and once more produced the differentiated, exploratory, "interim" personality, who rejoiced to recognize his prototype in the ancient world and lustily revivified his humanism. From the fifteenth century on, the whole of the modern age was one of individuation and of its corollary, classicism. Naturally, they brought friendship in their suite (somewhat diminished, to be sure, lacking its former halo, but still trailing incense )-in Montaigne, in Bacon, and in all those modern men of letters nearest in temperament to Greece and Rome. This spirit, pagan or modern, was thoroughly aristocratic. Ideal friendship was never egalitarian; it flourished in a select circle where members of the governing class moved at ease among their peers--in Plato's grove or at Theleme, wherever personal excellence was prized.
Individuation mounted higher and ever higher in modern times. In the sixteenth century the Reformation rejected the authority of the Church and made every man his own priest. The Age of Reason emancipated him-at least if he was "enlightened"-from dependence on revelation, and left him to the pursuit of happiness guided only by his -reason. From the eighteenth century on, the new economy not only altered vastly the material conditions of his life, but, under the influence of laissez-faire ideals, transferred what had once been social initiatives to his own shoulders.
This was the heriIage of nineteenth-century man. All of it heaped greater and greater burdens upon tbe individual; but it was exactly this that was the ideal of liberal man: freedom and equality for the person in a highly competitive society. Such a society meant only other autonomous individuals like himself. The individual---<:ach a world in himself-was all; the group was a mere expedient. Liberal man indeed, as Tocqueville wrote, after severing himself from the mass of his fellow-creatures and having "formed a little circle of his own, willingly left society at large to itself."
From this it followed naturally that the nineteenth century abounded in personalities, expressing themselves multifariously, and seeking, through free choice of association, to liberate and strengthen their uniqueness. Inasmuch as the unfettered choice of friends lies at the very roots of personality, the friendship of the age offered a kind of analogue to liberal freedom of trade and contract.
At the same time, the isolation of the individual assumed proportions such as had not been known since the Roman Empire. The more specialized and complex society became, the more marks of stress and insecurity made their appearance in numerous oddities of character, suggesting all sorts of frustrations. Now in any society, as Professor Cora Du Bois, the Harvard anthropologist, observes,' "the greater the frustration in goal-achievement, the more intense the friendship ties." The higber and more rigid the value-standards, sbe continues, the more limited will be the extensiondimension of friendship, and as a correlate the intensity of such individuals' friendship will be high. CerIainly, friendship was never more cberished tban in the nineteenth century, or more articulate; and the r6le of women in it would have amazed Epicurus bimself. One thinks of the circle of Dickens or of Mill, and especially of that of Tennyson:
... the divided half of such A friendship as had master'd Time.
Quite apart from these purely private shifts, signs of social disillusionment also appeared in the nineteenth century, baving their roots in an urbanized society and its competitive, individualistic culture, inwardly lonely and without adequate emotional eqUivalents for a devaluated family and religious structure.
This was rellected in tbe two ideologies which, after 1830, swept far *In her introduction to a preliminary draft of an important co-operative study of friendship. kindly lent me by Dr. Du Bois.
and wide: nationalism and socialism; both claiming to restore the psychical and economic gratifications once derived from kin and cult. Our own century has seen an even more frenzied nationalism; and socialism, shortly joined by fascism, has struck relentlessly at nineteenthcentury culture in the name of an ideal life of active solidarity for all, so that liberalism has been gradually reinterpreted or abandoned. One is inevitably reminded of the Hellenistic era and its utopian programmes and social movements that sought to recapture the Arcadian unity of pre-individual life in the city state. But these movements-nationalism, socialism, and fascism-although we call them mass movements, sprang not from plain folk, nor were they fostered and led by them, but from intellectuals-the Mazzinis, Marxes, and Mussolinis-who felt their individuality closing in upon them. The twentieth century altered this. As the working class rose to prosperity unprecedented in all history, and went on to greater and greater political assertiveness, it undertook a search for unity of its own -a unity quite innocent of ideology, and of fanaticism, its mate, but reflecting the sociable impulses of the average, non-intellectual manthe great majority.
Such a man, unlike the intellectual, had been little influenced by the classico-aristocratic tradition that had engendered and perpetuated the ideal of friendship ; and, as he rose to power, he was less and less disposed to recognize the Carlylean "right of the ignorant man to be guided by the wiser"-that is to say, by those who had assimilated that tradition. His own traditions were those of the peasant village, a community of diffused relationships and universal sociability, where intensity of experience and the differentiation of personality that leads to individual perfection are held contrary to the ethic of neighbourliness and the common good. He is Sir Herbert Read's man, who will readily "find safety in numbers, happiness in anonymity, and dignity in routine." His emphasis is on quantity, for are not numbers his virtue? Like primitive man, he accepts his comrades quite uncritically; but like him too, without comrades he would perish. Whatever Aristotle or Polonius may have said, he would retort: to have many friends is both desirable and possible.
The results of this revolution lie before us everywhere, especially in America. Reversing Rousseau's boasted overturn in letters, the shift in our society, in all it parts, has been accordingly from je to on. Collective life is once more with us, and again the dominant figure is the faceless, undifferentiated man, secure in his sense of belonging to a group; little influenced by the culture of an enlightened past; mass-made, standardized, stripped of separate identity, but compensated in forms of mass association.
If the nineteenth century, in its quest of reintegration through visionary schemes of exceptional men, was comparable to the Hellenistic age, we live in a likeness of the late Roman Empire--itself the dawning of the Middle Ages-when aristocratic ideals were traded for the egalitarianism of Christianity and its appeasement of the masses' longing for emotional security. In spite of the isolating context of city life, its anonymity and anxiety, in spite of his fitful rootings-up and partings in search of better fortunes, the mass man is really not as lonely as we are sometimes expected to believe; for, as David Riesman says, he is "people-minded," "at home everywhere and nowhere, and capable of a superficial intimacy with and response to everyone." In our society, the ideology of self-sufficiency has given way to "other-directedness"-a way of life sensitive to the actions and wishes of others, and dependent upon them for guidance.
The values of such a society (and few of us escape their constraints) are inevitably external, shallow, and instrumental-values such as may be produced and put about in quantity like merchandise, and as easily understood and enjoyed. Now friendship is a value not susceptible to standardization; it cannot be furnished mechanically for the market. It is no wonder, then, that by the consensus of our own and foreigu observers alike, friendship in America is on a level lower even than Aristotle's Himperfect" species. The "other-directed" man--of whom Willy Loman is the paradigm-makes wanting to be liked not merely an occasional but a primary source of his direction; to be liked, he thinks, is to be successful. Unlike the European, as Geoffrey Gorer says in The American People, friendship is for him "less a luxury than a necessity"; but his loyalities are weak, and his friendships mutually exploitative and of low intensity. The American is not friendless in comparison with the European: quite the contrary; but his friendship, as Gorer says, generally "has extension rather than depth, and is founded more on common interests than on congeniality of character."
During the Second World War, according to Dr. Margaret Mead in Male and Female, "buddy" relationships between GI's impressed English observers as merely transitory, deriving from "accidents of association rather than .. . any special personality characteristics capable of ripening into real friendship"; and in Korea, as she says, the Chinese captors of American soldiers were likewise struck by the weakness of their loyalties-based, it seemed, upon mere transient, materialistic values. Here, according to an Army psychiatrist writing in U.S. News and World Report, was the real reason why many of our prisoners < as he says) "caved in." If so, is it a mere coincidence that Dale Carnegie's bagman's handbook of instruction in specious amicability, with its "Six Ways to Make People Like You" has been a perennial best-seller?
Considering the transparent paltriness of such participations, it is also no wonder that many, who in other times might have turned to friendship on the classical models for real sympathy and companionship, have looked to marriage. More than one observer has agreed with R. L. Stevenson that, even at its lowest, matrimony is a modern "sort of friendship recognized by the police." But the many signs of strain it manifests seem to show <as a far greater poet had jeered) that "one chained friend" often proves "a jealous foe."
It would seem, then, that there is a to-and-fro in the history of friendship, corresponding to a kind of rhythm of separation and reunion: separation from the primal parent group and constant reunion with this wider, higher, being. We have seen the pendulum swinging from preclassical to classical, classical to mediaeval, mediaeval to modern; and from modern times it swings now toward a future yet unnamed. We have seen the ideal of friendship flourish in the hothouse where individual personality is cultivated, and watched it wither in the climate of intensified social solidarity and diminished personal liberty. It has had provisional existence only, bravely cherishing the second-best. As wholeness is renewed, the need for friendship vanishes.
Inasmuch as the ages of psychological and social integration fill most of historic time, the ages of individualism, associated with Periclean Athens, Rome at its height, and the brief span of modern times, are by contrast short, albeit vivid, interruptions. These are the interim ages, with their tentative ethic of friendship.
In fulfilment of present promise, then, further waning of friendship may be expected. After all, "other-directed" contacts and matrimonial expedients, like classical friendship, fall short of the warm, comforting togetherness of the world of Thou-a far older and, as some wonld contend, a more "natural" form of communion.
Indeed, a return to organic solidarity of sorts seems to be anticipated by most students of the future. Although-as Reginald Churchill says in his recent Spottgeschichte, where all the evidence is sifted-there is no Cambridge Future History to consult, and reliable monographic studies are also in short supply, we do have at least two authorities of FRIENDSHIP: AN INTERIM VALUE? 33 the highest reputation. Both augur a thin lookout for friendship in the years ahead. In Orwell's study of the fear-and hate-filled world so near, "you do not have friends," as he reports with ominous undertones, "you have comrades"; and in Huxley's disquieting glimpses of the brave new world farther off, all ties except to the state have disappeared, and separate friendship is a perverse depravity. "Community, Identity, and Stability" are the watchwords, and "Everyone belongs to everyone else."
Are these also Shelleyan "mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present?" As the world of Thou comes round again, will it be like this?
